Skills

Triage Validation

Finding validation before writing any report, 7-Question Gate (all 7 questions), 4...

Install

npx skills add awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter --skill triage-validation -g -a claude-code -y
Category
Writing
Updated
7d ago
License
MIT
Context cost
Mediumabout 3,000 tokens
Runs scripts
No, instructions only

What it does

Finding validation before writing any report, 7-Question Gate (all 7 questions), 4 pre-submission gates, always-rejected list, conditionally valid with chain table, CVSS 3.1 quick reference, severity decision guide, report title formula, 60-second pre-submit checklist. Use BEFORE writing any report. One wrong answer = kill the finding and move on. Saves N/A ratio.

TRIAGE & VALIDATION

One wrong answer = STOP. Kill it. Move on.

"N/A hurts your validity ratio. Informative is neutral. Only submit what passes all 7 questions."


THE 7-QUESTION GATE

Ask IN ORDER. One wrong answer = STOP immediately.


Q1: Can an attacker use this RIGHT NOW, step by step?

Complete this template:

1. Setup:   I need [own account / another user's ID / no account]
2. Request: [exact HTTP method, URL, headers, body, copy-paste ready]
3. Result:  I can [read / modify / delete] [exact data shown in response]
4. Impact:  The real-world consequence is [account takeover / PII read / money stolen]
5. Cost:    Time: [X minutes], Capital: [$0 / $X subscription required]

If you CANNOT write step 2 as a real HTTP request → KILL IT.


Q2: Is the impact on the program's accepted impact list?

Go to the program page. Find "Vulnerability Types" or "Out of Scope."

Common tiers:

  • Critical: Any-user ATO without interaction, RCE, SQLi with data exfil, admin auth bypass
  • High: Mass PII exfil, privilege escalation, internal SSRF with data, stored XSS all users
  • Medium: IDOR on specific user non-critical data, XSS on sensitive page requiring click
  • Low: Non-sensitive info disclosure, clickjacking with PoC

If your bug maps to a listed exclusion → KILL IT.


Q3: Is the root cause in an in-scope asset?

Confirm:

  • Vulnerable domain is on the in-scope list (not *.internal.target.com)
  • It's a production asset (not staging/dev unless explicitly in scope)
  • It's not a third-party service the company just uses (not Stripe, Salesforce, Google Auth)

If out-of-scope → KILL IT.


Q4: Does it require privileged access that an attacker can't realistically get?

Read the whole SKILL.md on GitHub

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