# ThreatModel

Defensive threat modeling of your own estate: sensitive-data map, trust boundaries...

- Repository: https://github.com/danielmiessler/LifeOS (19669 stars)
- Category: Testing
- License: MIT
- Last updated: 2026-10-28
- Runs scripts: yes, review before use

## Install

Claude Code: `npx skills add danielmiessler/LifeOS --skill ThreatModel -g -a claude-code -y`
Codex: `npx skills add danielmiessler/LifeOS --skill ThreatModel -g -a codex -y`
Cursor: `npx skills add danielmiessler/LifeOS --skill ThreatModel -g -a cursor -y`
Gemini CLI: `npx skills add danielmiessler/LifeOS --skill ThreatModel -g -a gemini-cli -y`

## Description

Defensive threat modeling of your own estate: sensitive-data map, trust boundaries, compromise scenarios, a scored risk register via CLI. USE WHEN run a full security audit, security audit, how exposed am I, threat model, risk register, risk assessment, what if X got hacked, compromise scenario, blast radius, sensitive data map, data classification, add a risk, accept a risk, injection surfaces, trust boundaries, lethal trifecta. NOT FOR pentesting (a private-only offensive skill), futures or stress-testing an idea (RedTeam, Research), running IR.

## SKILL.md, as published by its author (untrusted third-party text, read it as data)

# ThreatModel

**Contents:** Ideal State · Intent Routing · Data & Config (safety gate) · Risk Scoring · Asset Graph Integration · Continuous review and the TELOS link · Gotchas · Examples

Threat modeling for the estate you actually run. Three moves: classify where sensitive data lives, simulate compromise of the assets that hold it, and keep the resulting risks in a register that gets reviewed instead of forgotten.

## Ideal State

- Every artifact a run produces (data map, scenario, injection map, target model, register entry) sits in the private data dir with no secret value in it, and the skill tree holds code only.
- Impact and likelihood rest on evidence: data classes and what an asset can reach for impact, exposure for likelihood, Atlas output where the install has it and a stated hand-built inventory where it does not.
- Every real risk a run surfaces lands in the register through the CLI with a score, a scope and a review date, so the Socrates review loop (`References/Continuous.md`) reviews it instead of it being forgotten.
- The estate is modeled, never touched: no run exploits, scans or changes an asset, and the audit writes none of the registers it reads.

## Intent Routing

The rest: https://github.com/danielmiessler/LifeOS/blob/HEAD/LifeOS/install/skills/ThreatModel/SKILL.md