# Hunt Cicd

Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions workflow injection...

- Repository: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (5368 stars)
- Category: Security
- License: MIT
- Last updated: 2026-11-01
- Runs scripts: no, instructions only

## Install

Claude Code: `npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cicd -g -a claude-code -y`
Codex: `npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cicd -g -a codex -y`
Cursor: `npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cicd -g -a cursor -y`
Gemini CLI: `npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cicd -g -a gemini-cli -y`
Claude Code plugin marketplace: `/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter`

## Description

Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terraform state file leakage, artifact/log secret leakage, pipeline env-var disclosure. Use when target has a public GitHub/GitLab org, exposed CI dashboards (Jenkins/TeamCity/Drone/Argo), or build artifacts/images are reachable.

## SKILL.md, as published by its author (untrusted third-party text, read it as data)

# HUNT-CICD, CI/CD Pipeline Security

## Crown Jewel Targets

Jenkins `/script` console reachable = immediate RCE. A GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` (or `workflow_run`) workflow that checks out the **PR head ref** and references untrusted `${{ github.event.* }}` in a shell `run:` = "Pwnrequest" → secret exfil from a fork PR with zero approval.

**Highest-value findings:**
- **Jenkins Script Console**, Groovy execution → full RCE → dump the credential store
- **Jenkins CLI file read (CVE-2024-23897)**, pre-auth `@/etc/passwd` arg expansion → read `secret.key`/`credentials.xml` → forge admin → RCE
- **GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` injection (Pwnrequest)**, fork PR controls `${{ }}` inside a privileged shell step → exfil `GITHUB_TOKEN` (often `contents:write`) and org secrets
- **Self-hosted runner poisoning**, non-ephemeral runner on a public repo executes a fork PR's build → attacker code runs on the runner host → persistence + secret theft
- **OIDC trust-policy abuse**, over-broad `sub` claim wildcard in an AWS IAM role trust policy → any workflow in the org assumes a privileged cloud role
- **Terraform state leakage**, `*.tfstate` in public S3/GCS/Blob → plaintext infra creds, DB passwords, private keys
- **Runner token / artifact / log leakage**, register attacker runner, or harvest secrets printed before `::add-mask::`

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## "It-Didn't-Happen-Without-Proof" Gate (Read First)

CI/CD findings are over-reported because dashboards *look* exploitable. Before claiming anything:

The rest: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/blob/HEAD/skills/hunt-cicd/SKILL.md