# Hunt Graphql

Hunting skill for graphql vulnerabilities.

- Repository: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (5368 stars)
- Category: Security
- License: MIT
- Last updated: 2026-11-01
- Runs scripts: no, instructions only

## Install

Claude Code: `npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-graphql -g -a claude-code -y`
Codex: `npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-graphql -g -a codex -y`
Cursor: `npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-graphql -g -a cursor -y`
Gemini CLI: `npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-graphql -g -a gemini-cli -y`
Claude Code plugin marketplace: `/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter`

## Description

Hunting skill for graphql vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across IDOR via node() / GID, mutation IDOR including AI/LLM features, cross-tenant IDOR, SSRF via argument, batching-DoS, query-cost-bypass, SQLi via argument, broken-object-level-authz, auth-bypass via unscoped mutations, and PII exposure from missing field-level authz. Use when hunting graphql on any target.

## SKILL.md, as published by its author (untrusted third-party text, read it as data)

## Crown Jewel Targets

GraphQL vulnerabilities are high-value because the attack surface is both broad and deep, a single endpoint can expose entire data models, privilege escalation paths, and cross-API state confusion. Highest payouts occur in:

- **Platform APIs** (GitHub, Shopify, Stripe-tier targets) where GraphQL mutations interact with REST APIs managing the same resources
- **Race conditions between GraphQL mutations and REST endpoints** where state synchronization is non-atomic, these hit medium-to-high severity reliably
- **Authorization persistence bugs** where team/org/repo membership state is controlled by one API but readable/writable by another
- **B2B SaaS platforms** where one tenant affecting another via schema traversal = critical
- **Internal admin GraphQL endpoints** accidentally exposed to lower-privilege users

The GitHub reports demonstrate the crown jewel pattern: **privilege that should be revoked persists because two APIs disagree on ground truth**.

---

## Attack Surface Signals

**URL Patterns:**
```
/graphql
/api/graphql
/v1/graphql
/query
/gql
/graph
/api/v2/graphql
/internal/graphql
```

**Response Headers:**
```
Content-Type: application/json  (with query body)
X-Request-Id + no REST-style path params = likely GraphQL
```

**JavaScript Source Patterns:**
```js
// grep for these in JS bundles
"query {"
"mutation {"
"__typename"
"apollo"
"ApolloClient"
"graphql-tag"
"gql`"
"operationName"
"GRAPHQL_URI"
```

**Tech Stack Signals:**
- Apollo Server/Client in JS bundles
- Relay in React apps
- `graphene` or `strawberry` (Python), `graphql-ruby`, `gqlgen` (Go), `Lighthouse` (Laravel)
- POST requests with `{"query": "..."}` body shape in Burp history
- `__schema` or `__type` in any response = confirmed GraphQL

**Recon Sources:**
- `github.com` search: `"graphql" site:target.com`
- Wayback Machine for `/graphql` paths
- JS bundle scanning with `LinkFinder` or `getallurls`

---

## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

The rest: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/blob/HEAD/skills/hunt-graphql/SKILL.md