Hunt K8S
Hunt Kubernetes & Docker, API anonymous access, kubelet 10250 exec (SPDY/WebSocket...
Install
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-k8s -g -a claude-code -y- Repository
- elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter5.4k
- Category
- Security
- Updated
- 3d ago
- License
- MIT
- Context cost
- Mediumabout 3,000 tokens
- Runs scripts
- No, instructions only
What it does
Hunt Kubernetes & Docker, API anonymous access, kubelet 10250 exec (SPDY/WebSocket, NOT plain POST) and the simpler /run primitive, etcd 2379 unauth, dashboard skip-login, RBAC misconfig, secret/SA-token abuse, docker.sock host escape, runc/container-escape (Leaky Vessels CVE-2024-21626), API-server-mediated nodes/proxy RCE, EphemeralContainers node-shell, bound/projected SA-token audience+expiry abuse, admission-controller bypass, Helm/Tiller remnants. Use when target runs containerized infra, exposes K8s ports (6443/10250/10255/2379/8443), or cloud metadata reveals K8s service accounts.
HUNT-K8S, Kubernetes & Docker Security
Crown Jewel Targets
K8s API anonymous cluster-admin = full cluster control. docker.sock + RCE = host root. A single privileged-pod create or a kubelet /run shell pivots one finding to total compromise.
Highest-value findings:
- K8s API anonymous cluster-admin,
system:anonymous/system:unauthenticatedbound to a powerful role (classic misconfig:system:anonymousin aClusterRoleBindingtocluster-admin) → fullkubectl. Mere anonymous200is NOT this (see false-positive section). - Kubelet
10250exec/run,/runreturns command output directly;/execis a SPDY/WebSocket stream (see Phase 3). Either → RCE in any pod → steal that pod's SA token. - API-server-mediated kubelet RCE,
/api/v1/nodes/<node>/proxy/run/...reaches the kubelet through the API server using your (low-priv) token; if RBAC grantsnodes/proxy, you get pod RCE without touching 10250 directly. Primary 2024-2026 vector. - etcd
2379unauth, every Secret (SA tokens, TLS keys, app creds) stored, often plaintext (unlessEncryptionConfigurationis set) → full credential dump. - docker.sock exposure, SSRF/LFI/RCE reaching
/var/run/docker.sock→ create--privilegedcontainer, bind-mount host/→ host root. - Container escape via runc, Leaky Vessels (CVE-2024-21626):
WORKDIR/process.cwdpointing at a leaked/proc/self/fd/<n>host FD → break out of an attacker-controlled image/exec to host root. - SA token abuse, auto-mounted token at
/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token; check its real grants with SelfSubjectRulesReview before claiming impact. - K8s Dashboard skip-login / token-less API, full cluster management UI reachable unauthenticated.
OOB / Confirmation Gate (Read First)
K8s findings are RCE/credential-disclosure class. House rule: prove state change or data read, never infer from a status code.
