
Hunt Session
Hunt Session Management vulnerabilities, session fixation (no regeneration on login)...
Install
npx skills add Zyrexnn/Cybermes --skill hunt-session -g -a claude-code -y- Repository
- Zyrexnn/Cybermes987
- Category
- Security
- Updated
- 3d ago
- License
- Apache-2.0
- Context cost
- Mediumabout 3,000 tokens
- Runs scripts
- No, instructions only
What it does
Hunt Session Management vulnerabilities, session fixation (no regeneration on login), insufficient invalidation on logout / password-change / email-change, predictable or low-entropy session IDs, JWT-as-session with no exp/revocation, refresh-token rotation/reuse-detection gaps, OAuth/SSO session linkage, device-bound-session (DBSC) downgrade, and cookie attribute issues (Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite/__Host-). Validate with TWO real sessions (attacker A + victim B), body-diff every 200, and OOB confirmation for theft chains. Medium to Critical (fixation→admin hijack, no-invalidation→persistent ATO).
Autonomous Testing Priority
Missing HttpOnly on cookies is auto-detected, focus your active testing on lifecycle invalidation (higher impact).
Pattern 1, Session survives logout (most common high-value finding):
- Login and note the session token/cookie value
- Call the logout endpoint (
/logout,POST /api/logout, etc.) - Try to use the OLD session token to access a protected resource (
/api/me,/dashboard,/account) - If 200 with user data → session not invalidated on logout = ATO persistence
Pattern 2, Session not regenerated on login (session fixation):
- GET any page to receive a pre-authentication session token/cookie
- POST valid credentials to the login endpoint
- Compare the session token BEFORE and AFTER login
- If the token is unchanged → session fixation vulnerability
Pattern 3, Session survives password change:
- Login → record session A value
- Change the password via the account settings endpoint
- Replay session A on a protected endpoint
- If 200 → token not rotated on credential change = persistent ATO (critical chain when combined with XSS/cookie theft)
Content-type: Login and session endpoints vary, use application/json for REST APIs, application/x-www-form-urlencoded for traditional web forms. Try both if the first returns an unexpected response.
Proof: A protected-resource 200 response (with user data) using a session token that should have been invalidated confirms the finding.
HUNT-SESSION, Session Management
Crown Jewel Targets
Session fixation leading to admin hijack = Critical. Session surviving a password change = High-to-Critical (persistent ATO from a stolen cookie that the victim believes they revoked by resetting their password).

