Supply Chain Attack Recon
External recon for software supply-chain attack surface, package-namespace squatting...
Install
npx skills add Zyrexnn/Cybermes --skill supply-chain-attack-recon -g -a claude-code -y- Repository
- Zyrexnn/Cybermes987
- Category
- Security
- Updated
- 3d ago
- License
- Apache-2.0
- Context cost
- Mediumabout 3,000 tokens
- Runs scripts
- No, instructions only
What it does
External recon for software supply-chain attack surface, package-namespace squatting candidates, dependency-confusion vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions injection openings, container image registry exposure, SBOM mining, internal-package-name leakage, and CI/CD configuration exposure. Reconnaissance and identification ONLY, actual package publishing / typosquat attacks are EXTERNAL-OFFENSIVE and require explicit written sign-off because they can affect the entire npm/PyPI ecosystem. Use when the target has a public GitHub org, when their build artifacts/SBOMs are reachable, when their docker images are on Docker Hub/GHCR, or when you find internal package names in their JS bundles.
When to use
Trigger when:
- Target has a public GitHub organization (find via OSINT)
- JS bundles reference internal-looking package names (
@target-internal/...,target-utils,target-shared) - Build logs, SBOMs, or
package-lock.jsonfiles are publicly accessible - Target uses CI/CD that's partially public (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Bitrise)
- Docker images on Docker Hub/GHCR/Quay belong to target org
- Findings include
npmrc/pip.conf/gradle.propertieswith internal registry URLs .github/workflows/*.ymlfiles reference internal tooling
Do NOT use for:
- Internal-network artifact registries (out of scope per external boundary)
- Actually publishing typosquats / dep-confusion packages without explicit OK
- Compromising upstream open-source projects (massive blast radius, illegal in most jurisdictions without authorization)
The supply-chain attack surface map
Target Org
├── Public GitHub Org → workflow files → secrets exfil opportunities
├── Internal package names in JS/Android bundles → dependency confusion
├── Docker images on public registries → secrets in layers, RCE on pull
├── SBOM / artifact metadata → exact dep versions for known-vuln chaining
├── npmrc / pip.conf in repos → internal registry URL disclosure
├── External package dependencies → typosquat name candidates
└── Build/release pipelines → injection if pull_request_target etc.
Step 1, GitHub org discovery
TARGET="<brand>" # set to target brand name
# Direct guesses
for guess in $TARGET "${TARGET}-tech" "${TARGET}corp" "${TARGET}-io" "${TARGET}-eng"; do
curl -sI "https://github.com/$guess" | grep -E "HTTP|status" | head -1
done
# Via WHOIS / email-domain → GitHub search
gh search users --owner-affiliations=organization --query "$TARGET" --limit 10
# Via employees → reverse from social media + GitHub profile
# Many employees list their employer org on their GitHub profile
