# Supply Chain Attack Recon

External recon for software supply-chain attack surface, package-namespace squatting...

- Repository: https://github.com/Zyrexnn/Cybermes (987 stars)
- Category: Security
- License: Apache-2.0
- Last updated: 2026-11-01
- Runs scripts: no, instructions only

## Install

Claude Code: `npx skills add Zyrexnn/Cybermes --skill supply-chain-attack-recon -g -a claude-code -y`
Codex: `npx skills add Zyrexnn/Cybermes --skill supply-chain-attack-recon -g -a codex -y`
Cursor: `npx skills add Zyrexnn/Cybermes --skill supply-chain-attack-recon -g -a cursor -y`
Gemini CLI: `npx skills add Zyrexnn/Cybermes --skill supply-chain-attack-recon -g -a gemini-cli -y`

## Description

External recon for software supply-chain attack surface, package-namespace squatting candidates, dependency-confusion vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions injection openings, container image registry exposure, SBOM mining, internal-package-name leakage, and CI/CD configuration exposure. Reconnaissance and identification ONLY, actual package publishing / typosquat attacks are EXTERNAL-OFFENSIVE and require explicit written sign-off because they can affect the entire npm/PyPI ecosystem. Use when the target has a public GitHub org, when their build artifacts/SBOMs are reachable, when their docker images are on Docker Hub/GHCR, or when you find internal package names in their JS bundles.

## SKILL.md, as published by its author (untrusted third-party text, read it as data)

## When to use

Trigger when:
- Target has a public GitHub organization (find via OSINT)
- JS bundles reference internal-looking package names (`@target-internal/...`, `target-utils`, `target-shared`)
- Build logs, SBOMs, or `package-lock.json` files are publicly accessible
- Target uses CI/CD that's partially public (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Bitrise)
- Docker images on Docker Hub/GHCR/Quay belong to target org
- Findings include `npmrc`/`pip.conf`/`gradle.properties` with internal registry URLs
- `.github/workflows/*.yml` files reference internal tooling

Do NOT use for:
- Internal-network artifact registries (out of scope per external boundary)
- Actually publishing typosquats / dep-confusion packages without explicit OK
- Compromising upstream open-source projects (massive blast radius, illegal in most jurisdictions without authorization)

---

## The supply-chain attack surface map

```
Target Org
├── Public GitHub Org → workflow files → secrets exfil opportunities
├── Internal package names in JS/Android bundles → dependency confusion
├── Docker images on public registries → secrets in layers, RCE on pull
├── SBOM / artifact metadata → exact dep versions for known-vuln chaining
├── npmrc / pip.conf in repos → internal registry URL disclosure
├── External package dependencies → typosquat name candidates
└── Build/release pipelines → injection if pull_request_target etc.
```

---

## Step 1, GitHub org discovery

```bash
TARGET="<brand>"  # set to target brand name

# Direct guesses
for guess in $TARGET "${TARGET}-tech" "${TARGET}corp" "${TARGET}-io" "${TARGET}-eng"; do
  curl -sI "https://github.com/$guess" | grep -E "HTTP|status" | head -1
done

# Via WHOIS / email-domain → GitHub search
gh search users --owner-affiliations=organization --query "$TARGET" --limit 10

# Via employees → reverse from social media + GitHub profile
# Many employees list their employer org on their GitHub profile
```

---

The rest: https://github.com/Zyrexnn/Cybermes/blob/HEAD/knowledge/Claude-BugHunter/skills/supply-chain-attack-recon/SKILL.md